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By Diane Russell 
1983 was a watershed year for structural reforms in Zaire. It was after several sweeping 
policy changes made in this year that many in the international donor community came 
to believe that President Mobutu had finally gotten serious about reforming Zaire's 
corrupt and inefficient economy. A year after these reforms were announced, a new 
stand-by agreement was reached with the IMF for $160 million and Zaire's creditors once 
again were held at bay (Africa News 1985). Despite some retrenchment in 1986 and 1988, 
this support has generally been continued, and suggestions are now being made that Zaire 
should receive more aid to ease the strain of structural adjustment. 
For agriculture, the most important of these reforms was a Jaw which states that 
"the sale price of products and services are freely fixed by those who make the offer" 
(Ordonnance-Loi No. 83/026, 12 September 1983; translation by author). This Jaw 
represented a significant departure from agricultural marketing policies inherited from 
the Belgian era. 
Liberalization of agricultural prices and markets is seen to be the key to turning 
the Zairian economy around by channeling the energies of the Zairian entrepreneur from 
the "underground economy" into official channels and increasing incentive to agricultural 
production. Yet some major questions remain unanswered. First, to what extent have 
liberalization measures in themselves significantly reshaped Zaire's economic system? 
Second, how much change can be expected given that the Mobutu regime, so aptly 
characterized as patrimonial, parasitic, and authoritarian (Callaghy 1984), has been 
entrenched for over twenty-five years and continues to receive the support of major 
Western powers? Can this state articulate and enforce any kind of consistent strategy of 
economic reform? What can liberalization mean in a country where the state cannot and 
will not take responsibility for maintaining even the most basic services? Finally, what 
other forces within the Zairian economy reinforce or counter liberalization policies and 
how significant are these forces in comparison with government policy? (See also 
Nzongola 1983, Callaghy 1984, and Turner 1988 for further assessment of economic reforms 
in Zaire). 
These questions will be addressed in examining the impact of liberalization on the 
rice trade around Kisangani, Haut Zaire. The study from which this paper derives 
involved twelve months of fieldwork in and around Kisangani, from October 1986 to 
October 1987, interviewing rice traders, producers, and government officials. The rice trade 
was also observed in action at various locations and settings in the city and in the Zones 
of Isangi, Banalia, Yahuma and Opala within the sub-region of Tshopo which surrounds 
the city. This area accounts for 31 percent of Zaire's rice production (Conde 1981). Further 
information on agricultural policy and the history of agricultural marketing in the region 
was collected in Belgium in 1985 and in Kinshasa in 1987-88. Observations on issues related 
to this paper have also been made in the course of other research in Bandundu, Shaba, 
and Bas-Zaire regions. 
One goal of the study was to observe and describe rural-urban linkages, 
specifically, to trace the evolution of the rice trade from both the farmers' and traders' 
points of view and to look at the impact of government actions and policies on both 
groups. This goal was set in order to make a unique contribution to the study of Zaire's 
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political economy, which has hitherto been viewed mainly from the vantage point of 
either urban-based elites or disenfranchised rural dwellers. 
The models of the Zairian political economy fashioned by Callaghy (1984, 1986) 
and MacGaffey (1987) have inspired this study. Callaghy's detailed description of the 
patrimonial authoritarian Zairian state and MacGaffey's findings on the emerging 
Zairian bourgeoisie in Kisangani suggest differing views about the role and mobility of 
entrepreneurs in Zaire. MacGaffey's work emphasizes the dynamism of Zairian 
merchants and their relative independence from the state, while Callaghy stresses the 
state's pervasive presence and corrosive effects. 
It is hoped that by concentrating on the rice trade as a system involving actors 
from different sectors of the political economy, some of the tension between these two 
models can be resolved. We come to see how both the constraints and opportunities 
facing Zairian businesses are linked to the reproduction of the parasitic state in a cycle 
of decline, despite the individual gains made by some. Liberalization, as policy, has 
paradoxically added to the control of the state in some instances. Yet the efforts of large-
and small-scale entrepreneurs and the largely unremunerated labor of small producers, 
continue to keep the nation from starving to death despite official policy, and officials' 
actions. 
This paper will first briefly discuss the rationale for and background to 
liberalization in Zaire. Second, it will trace the evolution of the rice trade system within 
the context of overall economic change. Third, it will present the viewpoints and 
strategies of the major actors: farmers, traders, and government officials. Finally, it will 
describe the current configuration of the rice trade and show how struggle within it 
reflects fundamental contradictions within the Zairian political economy. 
Liberalization: Theory and Practice 
Liberalization is part of the package of structural adjustment policies which is promoted 
and, in many cases, rendered mandatory by the IMF/World Bank conditions for further 
loans and development assistance. The goal of structural adjustment is, ultimately, to open 
up the economy to investment by showing good faith on debt payments, dropping tariff 
barriers, and "rationalizing" the economy. 
This paper concentrates on one element of "rationalizing" the economy: the 
implementation of liberalization measures which eliminate or modify internal economic 
structures inhibiting access to and growth in agricultural marketing and production, 
including state marketing boards and parastatal monopsonies, and controls on prices and 
market access. These measures are attempts to create "budgetary and pricing policies ... 
that will switch the internal terms of trade toward agriculture" (IBRD 1984: 2). 
In a talk on structural adjustment at the American Cultural Center in Kinshasa in 
July 1988, Elliot Berg described the success of liberalization of the rice market in 
Madagascar, claiming that production had increased three-fold, and that farmers, not 
traders, had benefitted. This increase had been accomplished simply by raising the 
farmgate price. 
Arguments for liberalization have in fact had a very long history, which goes 
beyond the current debate about how to "fix" African economies. From Adam Smith to 
Milton Friedman, theorists of political economy have claimed that liberalized markets 
promote more democratic political institutions by giving a greater number of people more 
opportunity to participate in the economy and by loosening government controls. This 
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trend may indeed show itself in Zaire in the long term. For now, however, Africanist 
anthropologists, historians, and some economists are calling for a more sophisticated 
analysis of African political economies in their own right and less simplistic "cures" for 
complex and long-standing problems. 
Sara Berry (1987) argues, for example, that "getting the price right" may not always 
be simple or effective in increasing agricultural production, and Bates (1981) cautions that 
eliminating marketing boards and other structures which capture agricultural surplus 
often runs counter to the interests of elites and urban consumers. Recent events in China 
demonstrate that taking steps toward economic liberalization does not guarantee that 
democracy will triumph. 
Thus, in analyzing the impact of attempts at liberalization, it is necessary to look 
beyond abstract models of economic development and change to the history and structure 
of local economies, including factors such as the means and resources available to actors 
in the system and the ways in which power relations function to limit and control access 
to resources. 
In Zaire, several agricultural marketing parastatals were created in the aftermath 
of Zairianization in 1972-73, the transfer of ownership of many expatriate-owned 
enterprises and plantations. Seven out of eleven of these were eliminated in the late 1970s, 
including marketing parastatals for cereals, coffee and cotton, and the others' roles were 
sharply reduced. The gold and diamond trade was liberalized in 1983--with implications for 
investment in agriculture-as well as, in theory, the markets for rice and corn which were 
formerly under monopoly control. Yet price fixing and limits to market access are still 
very much features of the local economy. 
Liberalization of Zaire's agricultural marketing system presents difficulties beyond 
the issues of price and marketing boards, however. As will be seen, the very structure of 
the economy--the marketing system, credit, production and investment--are distorted 
around the "kleptocracy" (Nzongola 1983), soaring inflation rates, scarce foreign exchange, 
and uneven application of trade regulations. This is why the "liberalization" that has taken 
place has not lead to development, and how implementation of a "liberalization policy" 
can actually increase the control of non-productive local bureaucrats in the same way the 
laws for creation of agricultural "cooperatives" have become new means for controlling 
the peasantry. 
Background to Liberalization 
Many of the "inefficiencies" in Zaire's economy stem from the colonial era. Whites were 
subsidized as investors and plantation owners, petty commerce and transport was given 
over to the secondary sector (Asian, West African, Greek, and Portuguese merchants), and 
the tertiary sector of African laborers, farmers, and petty traders was very restricted in its 
movement and activities until almost the end of the colonial era. The Belgian Congo's 
food supply system functioned on a coercive basis to an extent paralleled only by 
Portuguese Mozambique. Northrup (1988:18) writes that "The institution of compulsory 
cultivation of rice for military use during the war [World War I] was the beginning of 
what would become a major and perennial feature of Belgian rule." It is an institution 
which persists in post-colonial Zaire as well. 
Zairianization, in 1973, was touted as an attempt to open up the first two spheres to 
indigenous participation, but in reality it provided the ruling clique the means to buy off 
political opposition and accumulate wealth. Parastatals such as Air Zaire and ON A TRA 
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(river transport) also began to siphon off revenue toward bureaucrats and away from 
productive investment at this time. 
MacGaffey (1987) has drawn our attention to the fact that Zairianization did open 
up business opportunities for some Zairians, and not all Zairianized businesses collapsed. 
Nevertheless, structurally, Zairianization contributed heavily to the decay of the economy, 
especially as credit and external investment dried up. More significantly, informants in 
Kisangani noted that Zairianization was the beginning of extreme corruption and the 
consolidation of power of Mobutu's one-party state, called the "party-state" (parti-etat) 
Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, or MPR. 
Zairianization also generated a great deal of resentment on the part of non-
beneficiaries toward Zairian business owners, regardless of whether they directly 
benefitted or not from Zairianization. Mistrust, jealousy, frustration and an "I'll get mine" 
mentality characterized employees' attitudes in many Zairian enterprises studied, 
exacerbated by salaries below a living wage which are mandated by national regulations 
and IMF restrictions. With Zairianization and the resultant burgeoning of the "acquirers" 
(acquereurs), who benefitted from transfer of ownership, the gap widened between the 
ordinary worker and the business owner. 
By the 1980s, this gap was a chasm. In 1987, prominent merchants rode around 
Kisangani in Mercedes and sent their children to Europe while their workers were paid 
$20 a month, and managers, many of them university graduates, earned $60 a month. 
Whether acquereur or not, the Zairian business owner "benefits" from very low labor costs 
and the semi-feudal relations which persist between the "patron" and his workers, many of 
whom may be family members (Tshilemalema 1987). Employees try to redress this 
situation throngh theft, poor job performance, and doing personal bnsiness on the job. 
The turnover rate is very high. The poor treatment of workers, endemically low wages, 
and the lack of opportunity for training and advancement have tremendously weakened 
Zairian businesses. 
In 1986-87, a gap also continued to exist between those merchants who were 
politically well-connected and able to get large loans from the development bank, and 
those who could not, no matter how hard-working and enterprising they were. In several 
cases, the politically well-connected received substantial loans for agricultural purposes, 
specifically for the rice trade, and did not engage in the rice trade at all.1 At the same 
time, the most successful rice trader in Kisangani (as described by other traders and by 
observation), did not qualify for a loan to purchase trucks, despite a long career in 
business in Kisangani and ownership of six other businesses. 
Devaluation wiped out many people's savings, and very high rates of inflation, 
brought about by a number of factors, have further weakened the economy. 2 The 
resulting system is characterized by a rapid turnover of investment and reluctance to 
invest in the long-term. Expatriate investors were burned by Zairianization and are 
1
0ut of 12 merchants' dossiers (19 total--not all could be found) at SOFIDE, the development bank, for credit for 
agricultural marketing (paddy) in Haut Zaire (trucks, rice mills) from 1983-1987, 5 merchants were not active in the rice 
trade in 1987 and were reported to have dropped out of or never participated in the rice trade. One of these merchants 
received credit twice, in 1983 and 1985, for a rice project never implemented. Another, one of the most influential men in 
Zaire, recently closed down his vast plantations in Haut Zaire and is never known to have been in the rice trade. 
2
0ther factors contributing to the decline included declining copper prices, wasteful spending of borrowed money 
(Inga-Shaba project, Maluka oil refinery), and the fuel crisis. 
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continually scalded by other measures to tax and harass them.3 Zairian businesspeople 
strive to attain hard currency placed in foreign banks or commodities. Tangible business 
assets are a liability as they are vulnerable to extreme taxation; machinery breaks down 
and cannot be replaced or repaired, yet these assets are what count when it comes to 
applying for official credit. The "second economy" which deals in illegal or "unofficial" 
trade is a means to accumulation but is inseparable from the "official" economy, as people 
use their jobs and political positions to obtain access to resources and to prohibit others 
from gaining access to lucrative markets ( cf. MacGaffey 1986). 
Despite Zairianization, expatriate-owned or controlled businesses in Kisangani 
have greater access than Zairian businesses to resources such as credit, as they have 
headquarters in Kinshasa where credit decisions are made, and ties overseas. It is these 
businesses, for example, that import rice from the U.S. and Thailand to Kisangani, to the 
outrage of local rice merchants, who claim that imports suppress the price of local rice. 
Rice in the Local Economy 
Though most Zairians do not live on rice, it is an important food crop and an integral 
part of the local economy. Cassava is by far the most important staple in Zaire but rice is 
not as perishable as cassava; it is also an investment and a feast food. Rice merchants in 
Kisangani reported that all rice collected was sold in Kisangani, and home consumption in 
producing areas around Kisangani is as high as 30 percent (Conde 1981 estimate). On only 
one occasion were there many sellers and no buyers in the central market and this was 
when a large shipment of U.S. rice had arrived. A group of market women specialize in 
rice and women also sell small quantities in front of their homes. Rice merchants felt that 
they were doing their region a service by buying rice and that, despite the many obstacles, 
the rice trade was a good investment because "people need to eat." 
In Haut Zaire, upland rice is grown by individual farmers on fields averaging one 
hectare. It is sown once a year in cleared forest fields and is intercropped with cassava, 
maize, plantains and squash. Peanuts are grown in rotation and, in some areas, cotton and 
coffee are also grown. Haut Zaire continues to lead all other regions in total rice 
production in Zaire despite drastically declining yields resulting from degenerated seed 
and lack of farmer incentive. 
Rice was introduced into Haut Zaire by the "Arabs": Swahili-speaking Zanzibaris 
who controlled the region in the late 1800s, and whose major activity was trading in ivory 
and slaves. It became a very important commercial and food crop in the colonial era, as 
new varieties were created and multiplied at the research center at Yangambi, 95 km west 
of Kisangani. 
Many of the villages in Haut Zaire which cultivated rice during the colonial era 
were isolated during the 1964 "Simba" Rebellion or later, during the deterioration of the 
rural areas that resulted from the Zairianization of plantations. Because of the lack of 
reliable markets and the low farmgate prices for their rice, farmers in these areas prefer 
to cultivate cassava or plantains, which can be consumed at home or more readily 
marketed in the petty trade channel (Mbaya 1980). 
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A "Presidential tax" of Zl00,000(1987) discourages expatriates from investing in small businesses. In 1987 also all 
expatriates had to get new visas at Z70,000 per visa regardless of whether or not they already had permanent residency. 
Ironically, however, expatriate businessmen and managers interviewed in Kinshasa felt that, while the business climate 
was very difficult, it was worse for Zairians than for them because they had some protection against harassment. 
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The History of Rice Marketing and Production 
Liberalization measures were designed to eliminate some of the most glaring 
inefficiencies in marketing systems and stem the disastrous production declines of the 
1970s and early 1980s. For example, the assigning of monopoly buying zones to traders was 
seen to depress producer prices and hence incentive and often left the more remote areas 
unserviced. These inefficiencies were based on models forged in the colonial era, models 
which created and perpetuated a stagnant and passive peasant sector. 
From the early colonial days to the present, cities, towns, plantations and mines 
have been provisioned by both petty traders using the riverways and larger concerns 
which were licensed by the state to buy in a certain area. Trade in smoked fish, forest 
meat, caterpillars, plantains, fruit, sugar cane, cassava leaves, and other cassava products 
was largely the province of indigenous traders, though markets were officially organized 
by the colonial government and even today market prices are still strictly controlled. 
In contrast, large traders and concerns have dominated the trade in corn and rice 
since the 1930s. Trading companies with exclusive contracts, parastatals, and plantations 
purchased within specific buying zones to sell in the urban areas or to their workers and 
were responsible for provisioning these zones in merchandise as well as maintaining roads 
and other services. 4 Farmers would often be paid on credit, sometimes months after the 
sale, or with merchandise and at a price or value equivalent well below market value of 
the crop. 
The cultivation of rice in Haut Zaire, like corn in Shaba and cassava in Bandundu 
has been obligatory since the early colonial period. Extension agents are an arm of the 
state who impose fines and jail sentences for non-cultivation. Producers are also heavily 
taxed and required to carry out unpaid labor for local officials (Mokonda 1980). Failure to 
obey results in fines, beatings, and jail sentences. 5 Very high rates of taxation and labor 
service, and corporal punishment are also legacies of the colonial era (Northrup 1989). 
For Shaba (Katanga), Jewsiewicki writes that "Thanks to the policy of compulsory 
cultivation in conjunction with fixed prices, as well as the trading monopoly which was 
greatly intensified during the Depression," extensive rural areas were subjugated to "the 
interests of private industry by compelling them by administrative and political measures 
to engage in poorly rewarded agricultural production." 
In a conclusion that mirrors current development issues, he finds that "This model, 
which ensured cheap labour and food supplies for the economy and particularly for 
capitalist industry, rapidly imposed severe constraints on the internal market. Despite 
numerous attempts, starting from 1948-1950, to modify the situation, the commercialization 
of African agriculture was not possible within a framework which involved placing the 
African farmer out of reach of the market" (Jewsiewicki 1977: 33). 
Thus the model for grain production and marketing inherited from the colonial 
era was characterized by controls on trade, as the state issued licenses for buying in 
certain areas, and compulsory cultivation with corresponding low farmgate prices. Until 
4
This system was modified in Kivu (Conde 1981), where licensed traders were always permitted to buy in any 
Zone. Kivu has a more active rice trade, and farmgate prices are higher than Haut Zaire, especially on the Rwandan 
border. Nevertheless, traders and farmers smuggle rice across the border when possible as it fetches up to three times 
more there (after ''border costs"). 
5
These punishments were reported in Haut Zaire and Bandundu, less so in Shaba. Many residents of these two 
regions feel that they are still being punished for having been centers of the Sirnba and Mulelist rebellions in 1964. 
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the 1970s, all licensed rice traders in Haut Zaire were expatriates who owned a rice mill 
and truck(s) for collecting rice, or agents of plantations and concessions such as PLZ 
(Lever Plantations) and Busira-Lomami who had exclusive rights to buy in their 
concession areas. 
This system was separate from trade in other food crops which was dominated by 
the Lokele, a fishing and trading people. The food trade was one of the only avenues 
open to African entrepreneurs and the Lokele came to play a key role in Kisangani's 
economy and political life (Pons 1959; Lokomba 1972). Not surprisingly, the Lokele are 
now heavily represented in the category of official licensed rice trader in Kisangani (5 
out of 18 surveyed). 
Beginning in the late 1970s, petty traders, dubbed Lolema or "bat" in Swahili, 
proliferated around Kisangani, buying paddy and rice which had been manually 
decorticated by farmers in defiance of the law against, this practice. These traders were 
tolerated, as they paid fines when caught trading without a license, and they could go into 
areas not covered by the "official" rice traders and evacuate crops which were rotting 
there for lack of buyers. High rates of unemployment swelled the ranks of these "pirates," 
many of whom were unemployed teachers. 
At the same time, a few Zairians entered the rice trade as licensed traders, either 
through Zairianization of an expatriate-owned business or through their own efforts. One 
Kisangani merchant bought his first rice mill in 1971 and has been buying rice in his zone 
of origin since that time. 
Responding to the problem of unsold rice, Agricultural Department officials in 
Haut Zaire sought to modify the monopoly system early in the 1980s by opening up the 
rice trade in a given buying zone to any licensed trader when the trader assigned to that 
zone had bought as much as he could for the season. This concession was designed to 
strengthen the licensed traders in their fight with the Lolema, who by 1980 were identified 
as a major perturbation in the rice marketing system (ANEZA 1980). 
In Kisangani, the rise of the Lolema coincided with the move of rice mills from 
the interior to the city. This move was bronght about by a number of factors, primary of 
which was the fuel crisis, which made electric mills much cheaper to run than diesel mills. 
Other factors included the deterioration of agricultural feeder roads and the inability of 
the Zairian merchants, by now the majority of licensed rice traders, to keep competent 
and honest managers in the countryside to safegnard their assets ( cf. Tshilemalema 1987). 
As described above, the rapid "class formation" resulting from Zairianization had created 
a gap between Zairian business owners and their workers which caused mistrust and 
resulted in widespread theft and shirking of work. 
The deplacement of rice mills into the city further isolated rural areas for whom 
the rice mills represented a source of employment and contact with the outside world. 6 
The rice mills did, however, represent a new economic niche in a city plagued by high 
unemployment (Balwisha 1986). 
6ct. Timmer 1975 on the role of rural rice mills in Indonesia in generating rural development. 
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The Farmers' View of Rice Production and Marketing 
In Kisangani and Tshopo, strategies open to rice producers to maximize revenue and 
minimize uncompensated labor are very limited. Men relegate most of the work in the 
fields to women and concentrate mainly on more lucrative activities such as hunting and 
fishing. Some women in Banalia Zone complained that they even have to cut and burn 
the forest field. This division of labor was illustrated in studies carried out by Tollens' 
students at Yalibua, in Isangi Zone (Kaseko 1975; Tshibaka-Mukendi 1975-76; Tshiunza 
1983). 
They found that the major constraint to rice production was male labor in cutting 
and burning fields. A man will invest in bridewealth for a second or subsequent wives if 
possible in order to increase household labor input without increasing the obligatory area 
to be cultivated--calculation of which is based on the Belgian system that only labeled 
men as "cultivators." A second strategy open to farmers is to resist further demands of 
extension agents, beyond the bare minimum of cultivating the area specified. 
Mbaya's (1982) study of Turumbu (Isangi Zone) rice farmers' resistance to planting 
in lines and other "new," more intensive techniques, illustrates this point. These farmers 
also clearly expressed their feelings of being duped and even enslaved by the 
"Cooperative" charged to buy their rice. Though called the Turumbu Cooperative, this 
organization has never been managed by farmers, who in fact have had no input in its 
formation or policy. It is primarily a rice-buying monopoly, managed by a Kisangani-
based trader who, still in 1986-87, had the exclusive license to buy in Turumbu Collectivity. 
This area, only 90 km from Kisangani, was formerly the most productive rice zone in 
Zaire, but due to the poor management of the "cooperative" and very low farmgate prices, 
Turumbu rice production has declined dramatically (Lokomba 1987). 
A third set of strategies open to the farmer to increase revenue is to sell to 
Lolema, at night, at prices higher than the "official" price, or after having manually 
decorticated the rice. The farmer may also refuse weighing the paddy during the sale and 
insist on selling by the sack. On the surface, this may seem to work to the farmer's 
disadvantage. In reality, the farmers know full well that traders use rigged scales.7 
Farmers, in their turn, will try to trick the traders by filling the sacks with quantities of 
chaff and dust. 
Finally, a few farmers may sell their own rice in Kisangani. This usually involves 
transport by bicycle or headload and canoe. Only the most educated and/or affluent 
farmers make this trip, as one runs the risk of theft, spoilage from water, harassment by 
the military, and roadblocks. 
Divisions at the village level between MPR officials, traders, educated people, and 
farmers reflect the relatively low status and low income of the cultivator ( cf. Roberts 
1986). At a meeting of women in Banalia, the Zone capital north of Kisangani, this 
division between traders and wives of officials on the one hand, and farm women (mamans 
paysannes) on the other, was observed. Farm women were requested to fetch and carry 
items by the other women, they did not sit in chairs and stood off by themselves. One 
Maman Paysanne highlighted the difference between the two "classes" when she remarked 
that all women are not alike in that "some of us eat twice a day, while the rest only eat 
once a day." 
7
This practice was confirmed by direct observation. 
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Fortunately, land is not yet a scarce factor in production in the Tshopo sub-region 
except around the largest towns, as it has become in more populous areas. 8 Farmers at 
Turumbu, west of Kisangani, however, told a researcher that they had been informed that 
the land did not belong to them, and was the property of the state (Mbaya 1981; see also 
MacGaffey 1980).9 
Though rural dwellers are not yet alienated from the land in Tshopo, there is little 
in the way of amenities. "Dispensaries, maternity clinics and schools ... often exist only in 
adminstrative reports" (Mokonda 1978; translation by present author). Several villages 
visited in the outlying areas of Yahuma Zone, within the sphere of influence of the giant 
Lever Plantations (PLZ), were lacking schools and clinics altogether, but the villagers' 
chief complaint was that they had no way to buy merchandise. 
With the advent of a few traders menacing their long-held monopoly, PLZ no 
longer maintains the roads or stocks the canteens. The director of plantations for PLZ 
expressed a wish to cultivate rice now on large fields with tractors rather than continue to 
buy from local farmers (Dodd 1988). The possibility of financing traders to buy rice or 
palm nuts from smallholders was not entertained. 
It is impossible to get reliable production figures, but observers have noted over 
the last twenty years that farmers moved out of rice when no buyers were forthcoming or 
coercion power was low (Mbaya 1981; Conde 1981). One calculation made in 1982 found 
that, to become profitable, farmgate prices for rice would have to exceed 13.3 Zaires per 
kilogram (Tshiunza 1982). This price was not achieved until 1987, and then only in some 
areas. Thus profitable rice production has not been even a remote possibility. 
In Kisangani, the price of cloth, perhaps the most important trade item, tripled 
from November 1986 to November 1987, while farmgate prices for rice doubled only in the 
most active zones and in many areas increased only 50-60 percent. Increases in the price 
of manufactured goods were given as a reason by several traders for not provisioning 
farmers. With higher prices it takes too long to sell the goods and traders, racing against 
inflation, must make quick trips to turn over their funds. 
From the research of Northrup (1988), Jewsiewicki (1977), and Peemans (1987), we 
see that this lack of investment and faith in African farmers, as well as the low status of 
the cultivator, are long-standing and, as such, represent a fundamental part of the nation's 
value system. Hence, it is not price alone which discourages farmers. There is little respect 
for the endeavor and no feeling that improvements in living conditions can be made 
which could be passed on to the next generation. 
8
Reports and observations of land tenure problems resulting from conflicts between clan tenure holders and 
"outsiders" buying land for coffee or cattle raising, or clan tenure holders and plantations have come from Kivu 
(Newbury 1984), Southern Shaba (Schoepf and Schoepf 1984), and Bandundu (personal observation). 
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A 1973 law converted all land in Zaire to state ownership. The issue of traditional land tenure has not yet been 
resolved (see Macgaffey 1980) and has potential to be an explosive issue in the years to come. These land tenure 
struggles seem to indicate that investment is being made in rural areas and, indeed, in areas where easy evacuation of 
crops is possible, this investment is visible. The issues however, are road maintenance and other investments in the rural 
economy. 
In Bandundu, for example, stretches of road are maintained by PLZ and other palm oil companies. In these areas, 
the indigenous manufacture of palm oil is forbidden and punished and palm nut cutting is extremely poorly paid. Locals 
who are able to purchase cattle become discouraged by excessive taxation and many end up selling their assets. When 
the palm oil companies pull out, however, the villagers become isolated and have very little way to get revenue. 
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We have seen then that rice farming is not profitable, nor was it ever designed to 
be. In addition, the farmer is a "second-class citizen" whose milieu lacks even the barest 
amenities, whose movements are strictly controlled, and who lacks even legal rights to the 
land she or he farms. Liberalization has raised farmgate prices in some areas, but the 
farmers are now unable to get, and afford, merchandise coming from the city. Their seeds 
and tools are worn out and farm women are disastrously overworked. "Cooperatives" 
formed in their name are designed without their input and with the purpose of 
maintaining monopoly control and keeping prices low. 
In Bandundu, the farmers' situation is perhaps more difficult and may be a 
harbinger for Haut Zaire. Here the forest is rapidly being destroyed, burned in frantic 
efforts to smoke out a few rats and snakes to sell or eat. Men's income-earning potential is 
even more restricted because there is virtually no game left. Good land is hard to come by 
and is being bought up by urban elites in collusion with local authorities. Since many of 
these sales involve absentee owners, the land is often not used productively. 
MacGaffey (1980: 103) cautions that if the situation of rural people in Zaire "is one 
of malnutrition rather than starvation, [it] is partly a tribute to the survival of customary 
land tenure." Development planners who see individual ownership of land as a 
prerequisite for productive investment might do well to study the use of and control over 
other resources in the "private sector" in the last twenty years, as well as the--often 
horrifying--history of Zaire's concession areas (Northrup 1988, see also Berry 1988 on land 
tenure). 
The Traders' Survival Strategies 
Rice traders have their own strategies for survival in the tumultuous Zairian economy. 
The risks are great, but the profit can also be substantial for a successful trader. For 
smaller traders, it is a way to scratch out a living and keep up with inflation.The 
successful rice professional, defined as a licensed trader with a rice mill and, in some cases 
a truck or trucks, goes on the rice campaign himself or sends a close and trusted relative. 
He pays workers subsistence wages and provides food and alcohol. Thus, labor costs are 
kept low. With up to 72 percent unemployment in Kisangani, if some workers leave, 
others can always be found (Huybrechts and Van der Steen, cited in MacGaffey 1987). 
The trader will personally survey the filling of the sacks and each sale. He may try 
to get the approval of local authorities by repairing a stretch of road or a bridge, by 
selling merchandise at discount prices or, as in one case observed, by threatening and 
bribing them to restrict other traders. 
If the rice professional buys rice and owns a rice mill in Kisangani, he tries to 
keep milling prices high, to shut out Lolema. If he does not have a truck or is not doing 
the rice campaign, but owns a rice mill, he keeps milling prices low, or finds other ways to 
attract Lolema, such as paying for transportation and meals (which must later be 
reimbursed by the Lolema after sale of the rice). 
Thus, the rice professionals are pitted against one another in the sense that some 
only have rice mills and must attract Lolema, whereas others are in direct competition 
with Lolema in the buying campaigns and, as discussed above, by the fact that some have 
received substantial credit and others have not (Blanga 1986). 
The failure to procure credit has caused the virtual dissolution of the Committee 
of Rice Professionals, representing rice mill owners, which is grouped under ANEZA, the 
Chamber of Commerce. Another committee of merchants, CICA, was similarly 
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disaffected when they discovered that most of the credit available for the year (1988) went 
to non-CICA members (Yuma 1988). 
These committees were set up by the government under various agricultural 
development programs in order to provide information to food crop merchants about 
credit programs and other activities such as road maintenance. They were also supposed 
to provide a forum for these merchants to discuss their problems and possible solutions. 
Since no concrete benefits have been forthcoming, the membership in these organizations 
has declined drastically and few meetings ever take place. Thus, rice merchants have 
learned that it is "every man for himself." In theory this kind of "competition" should 
serve as a stimulus in the economy, but in reality the fact that Zairian merchants cannot 
act together as a group makes them more vulnerable to bureaucratic moves to siphon off 
their profits (new taxes, licenses, fines, and so on). 
As described above, the Lolema are petty traders, coming from both the 
traditional food trade sector and the ranks of the unemployed, who have entered the rice 
trade in the last decade. A Lolema may use family ties in the area to get clients (50 
percent of 20 Lolema randomly surveyed in rice mills in October 1987) or have regular 
clients from whom rice is bought (80 percent surveyed). One strategy for increasing 
revenue is to try to stuff the sacks with more paddy than paid for (the reverse of the 
farmers' strategy). Thus, the trader gets a greater quantity of white rice per sack after 
milling. He or she sells a bit more rice every trip than the trip before and has a bit more 
to invest on the next trip--or at least keeps up with inflation. These traders are constantly 
in motion, and the majority surveyed claimed that they do not have time to sell 
merchandise in the rural areas. By mid-October, the Lolema surveyed had already made 
an average of 2.75 trips, and the rice campaign had only officially begun one month 
before. 
One rice mill manager said that a few Lolema are able steadily to increase the 
number of sacks bought with each trip. With the profits, one-third of those surveyed 
planned to stay in the rice or peanut trade while others wished to move on to trade in 
palm oil, coffee, salted fish, or petrol, or to take up other occupations. Precisely what 
makes a Lolema able to increase her or his revenue with each trip is unknown. A rice 
mill manager and our survey both suggest that women are less successful than men, in the 
sense that they purchase fewer sacks of rice. Other possible determinants of success are 
education and family support. 
The Lolema are a diverse group which has many activities other than the rice 
trade. They lack the capital to invest in production, in terms of seed or tool distribution, 
and those interviewed did not have credit associations or pooling of resources (with the 
possible exception of some Lokele families). The rice professionals are also involved in 
many other activities, most of them non-agricultural, and have failed as a group to get 
access to credit for agricultural campaigns, funds for feeder road maintenance, tools, 
seeds, or foreign exchange for spare parts and trucks. Thus, though Zairians are now the 
main actors in the rice trade, no development has taken place. In fact, to an observer, it 
seems almost a miracle that the system functions at all. 
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The State's Role 
The government officials involved in the rice trade at the local level include the zone 
commissioner, Department of Agriculture officials and agricultural extension agents 
(monagris), local chiefs, and, in the background, the military. 10 It is through these officials 
than national agricultural policy must be implemented. Because of the predatory and 
corrupt nature of the ruling party, however, these officials do not have the respect of 
farmers and traders. In areas controlled by large plantations, they may actually have little 
power. For example, in Lokutu, the headquarters of Lever Plantations in Haut Zaire, the 
zone commissioner lives in a house owned by the company and informs the company of 
activities of traders in the zone. 
Many local officials are hardworking and competent but their effectiveness on the 
job is also severely limited by lack of funds and the unstable political climate. Banalia 
Zone, north of Kisangani, had seven zone commissioners in seven years. Under the 
patrimonial system described by Callaghy (1986), they are accountable only to Kinshasa. 
The Department of Agriculture is desperately poor and its agents, like the military, must 
prey on the farmers to survive. Only the regional inspector in Kisangani has a vehicle for 
"inspecting" an area the size of France, but often no funds for fuel. The building which 
houses the Department in Kisangani has no light fixtures in all but the inspector's office, 
and monthly zone reports often complain that lateness is due to lack of a typewriter or 
paper. 
Before 1983, agricultural price setting and licensing were carried out at the level of 
the sub-region for all seven zones in the sub-region. The system was quite straightforward: 
a licensed trader was assigned to a given area and it was his responsibility to get out the 
rice. 
Zone officials now have more control over the process and there is more room to 
"negotiate" on licenses, taxes, access, and opening the season. Some local officials have 
tried to implement liberalization policies to the extent that they permit discussion of the 
official price at the start of the campaign, but this practice does not imply that prices and 
market access in their zones are liberalized. 
In one zone, Catholic missionaries privately accused the zone commissioner of 
colluding with a large trader to restrict other traders from buying rice. At the opening of 
the rice buying season, this commissioner was nowhere to be found and the long-awaited 
collective bargaining session never took place. In another zone, roadblocks were set up to 
catch "illegal" (non-licensed) traders. 
Officials often expressed the impossibility of implementing full liberalization. 
Echoing colonial sentiments about the need to tutor and organize (encadrer) farmers, both 
large traders and officials rarely if ever see the farmer as an active agent. In discussing 
the Lolema, both these groups agree that their presence injects unwanted "anarchy" into 
the system. 
10
one study estimated that 58 percent of the population in Haut Zaire depended on the revenue earned by 
military personnel (SICA! 1971). Since these troops' actual salaries are very low, they must scavenge for other ways to 
earn revenue. As an arrested person is obligated to pay for his arrest, including the soldier's fee, frequent arrests help to 
finance the military and its dependents. Villagers can be arrested for a wide range of offenses, including cutting palm 
trees, public drunkenness, "vagabondage," leaving the village without written authority, and "superstitious practice" 
(Annual Report, Haut Zaire 1978). 
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This conception was reinforced at the Second Annual Regional Agricultural 
Conference in Kisangani in November 1986 whose theme was "Towards a Better 
Organization of the Peasantry for Increased Production." One of only two women invited 
to the conference, both MPR officials, remarked during the proceedings that the theme 
was a bit ironic since no "peasants" had been invited (and of course no petty traders as 
well). 
There is, of course, a self-serving element to the concepts of peasant passivity and 
the need to control trade in that the local officials' revenue is substantially derived from 
taxes, fines, and licenses resulting from laws that restrict trade and farmers' activities or 
from the bribes of large concerns. Yet the conception is also deeply embedded in peoples' 
consciousnesses. One clan chief from Isangi Zone described how his people are instilled 
with fear of leaving their villages by agents of a large trading concern which has the 
monopoly for palm oil, and how they feel powerless vis-a-vis traders and officials. 
The Domestic Economy as a Factor 
in Rice Production and Trade 
The political economy as sketched out above in relation to the rice trade both shapes and 
is shaped by relations in the domestic economy--within the (extended) family and between 
men and women. Tshilemalema (1987) has pointed out that relations in the Zairian family 
are not "traditional" but are a result of poverty and dependence. In this domestic economy, 
a salary-earner, merchant, or small business owner is the nexus of myriad dependent 
relationships. 
At the household level, men and women are often at odds with each other, torn 
apart by competing demands for labor and money needed to survive. Women's needs and 
responsibilities differ from men's, and women are kept in line with beatings and 
witchcraft accusations, as well as by laws which restrict their access to banking and jobs. 
Women do most of the work in rice production. Men sell the rice and decide how 
much of the revenue goes to women. Work on rice fields often conflicts with work on 
cassava, the women's crop. Around the town of Banalia, women reported walking up to 
fourteen kilometers to rice fields on treacherous forest paths inundated with water. 
Produce is carried home on the back, in packs of up to 50 kilos. 
In the cities, prostitution and concubinage are often the only avenues open to 
women to make a living and this is how many women get initial capital for trading. One 
long-time rice merchant said that 60 percent of the Lolema women were prostitutes. When 
a woman marries, however, it is expected that she will turn over her earnings to her 
husband, a practice that often leaves both women and children's financial needs unmet. 
Thus it is more difficult for women traders to control their own incomes and less likely 
that pooled income will be used for women's businesses. 
On the other hand, women are less "visible" than men, and may be able to carry 
out small-scale trade with less harassment than men. Lokele women are particularly noted 
for their role in food supply around Kisangani, both as market sellers and petty traders. 
Lokomba (1972) attributes much of this success to family solidarity and strong bonds 
between husband and wife. 
Another successful trading people, the BaNande of Kivu, who supply Kisangani in 
vegetables and smoked fish, are also noted for their family and ethnic solidarity. 
According to Streiffler and Mbaya's study, however, this solidarity does not extend to 
BaNande cultivators who complained that they had no idea how their crops were being 
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sold and were living in abject poverty (Streiffler and Mbaya 1987). Thus ethnic and family 
ties are very limited as bases for productive investment. Few farmers reported working 
the fields in groups or helping out family members, which may indicate weak clan and 
lineage ties or concerns about exploitation by family members. 
The Rice Trade System Today 
The current rice trade system reflects fundamental contradictions in the Zairian economy. 
On the one hand, there is already substantial "liberalization" in the form of the Lolema 
and Zairian participation as rice professionals. In some cases, revenue from smuggling 
and liberalization of the diamond, gold and coffee markets has also been invested in the 
rice trade. There is indeed a whole lot of trading going on. How the profits from trading 
are invested is another issue, however, which relates to the structure of the economy, 
including availability of credit, maintenance of infrastructure, training of workers, and 
clearly defined regulations. Investment in production requires some confidence in the 
economy and resolution of the factors described above. This confidence is justifiably 
lacking. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the liberalization policy, per se, has 
taken control out of the hands of merchants who had formerly run their buying zones, 
and put it more in the hands of local officials who control licensing, taxation, and access, 
often in collusion with large traders and concession holders. This tendency is illustrated 
by the creation of the new rice campaign regulations after liberalization, and the actual 
way these regulations are put into practice, as discussed below. The colonial model, in 
effect until 1983, gave responsibility to the licensed trader, not only for buying the rice but 
for distributing seed, provisioning the rural areas and maintaining the roads. This was 
certainly an unfree market but it did have certain benefits in that traders were motivated 
to invest in rural areas. Though in a paternalistic way, they were at least expected to take 
some responsibility for their areas. 
Theoretically, liberalization should offset these paternalistic benefits by increasing 
competition and hence raising farmgate prices. Though there is some movement in that 
direction, in Banalia, for example, evidence points to the likelihood that local officials, 
not farmers, are capturing the increases in farmgate prices through taxes, fines, and fees. 
The cost of a license to trade in rice was increased five-fold from 1986 to 1987 and 
primes or cuts to local authorities are substantial (as much as 10 percent of the farmgate 
price). In addition there is an "evacuation tax" that even farmers must pay to sell their 
own rice, and often gifts must be given to officials. In Isangi Zone, Chinese from a 
nearby sugar factory started purchasing local rice at a higher than usual price but didn't 
pay these primes. The next year they were prevented by zone authorities from buying 
rice. 
In theory, rice prices and access are determined in collective bargaining sessions at 
the beginning of the rice "campaign." Setting this date is in itself a tool to be 
manipulated, as those traders who buy "early" are subject to fines and confiscation of their 
rice. In practice, if and when this bargaining session does occur, only a few large traders 
and collectivity chiefs are present. 
The licensed traders, those rice professionals who buy rice, want to eliminate the 
Lolema competition and often discuss ways to squeeze out these smaller traders. The 
collectivity chiefs, for their part, usually do not and cannot represent the producers' 
interests. This post, which represents a grouping of up to fifty villages, is often filled by 
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an MPR official who is not a recognized clan leader. Formerly, this was the chiefly 
position imposed by the Belgians to extract labor and crops from the population 
(Northrup 1988). 
The colonial system is also reflected in the continuing use of the term capita, or 
work-boss, to describe certain village leaders who get a prime from the rice sales, along 
with the chief. The prime is based not on price per sack or kilogram but on number of 
sacks sold. Thus, the chiefs have no real incentive to bargain for higher prices, since 
cultivation is obligatory. 
Now there is also no incentive or means for licensed traders to maintain the roads 
or to provision the rural areas. As noted above, licensed traders, or rice professionals, were 
not able to benefit from being part of a group, either in terms of access to credit or funds 
for road maintenance. Many remarked that political ties, especially in Kinshasa, 
determined access to credit, not ability as a trader or membership in a professional group. 
In observing the overall structure of the rice trade, one sees a constantly shifting 
pattern of production and investment. Since rice farming has rarely been profitable, it is 
cultivated under obligation and other activities have taken priority. Both Lolema and rice 
professionals have many other, often conflicting, activities. It was often difficult to locate 
rice merchants for interviews, as they were taking care of other business or personal 
matters outside of the city. 
The communication system is also very weak. Information is limited as to where 
rice to be sold is available and how much is available. Arriving in a village, a trader must 
send out "scouts" to dig out pockets of unsold rice. Often, rice is unsold for months or 
forever. In addition, one is never completely informed about the state of roads and 
bridges. Roads can be cut off for months or years. Similarly, in Shaba, after months of 
concerted effort on the part of an agricultural development project to increase corn 
production, the railroads ceased to function during the peak buying season and corn piled 
up at the railheads. 
Like the buying of rice, the rice mill business is also highly uncertain. In surveying 
rice mills in Kisangani, it was discovered that, from 1985 to 1987, only 10 out of 24 rice 
mills were still in operation--and only one from 1982 (Balwisha 1986). Many registered rice 
mills in Kisangani were closed when visited during the rice season; others had opened 
which were not registered. Many were closed periodically during the year of observation. 
Investment in the rice trade is by no means a sure thing. Two investors were 
interviewed whose initial capital had been made in the diamond and gold trade. One 
initiated a failed rice campaign venture, while the other decided not to invest after seeing 
the difficulties involved. The most successful rice trader in Kisangani, active in the rice 
trade since 1982, sold his truck and rice mill in December 1987 and went to Nigeria for an 
extended trip. With the profits from these sales, he opened up a store for building 
materials. 
The rice trade has thus been an avenue of accumulation for some, but profits are 
often not put back into the trade. There were very few instances observed of any 
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investment made in rice production or in improvements of rice producing areas. 11 Tools 
are rudimentary, seeds degenerated, and seed distribution programs very scanty and 
sporadic, fertilizer and pesticide use nonexistent, and labor inputs, as discussed above, are 
severely limited by farmers' other activities. 
Many rice merchants, however, including the president of ANEZA and the 
president of the Rice Professionals Committee feel that rice production and marketing 
could be the engines of development for the region, given research on new rice varieties, 
credit, and investment in infrastructure. As befitting their positions, the officials were 
optimistic about the future. Other rice traders said that the rice trade could be very 
lucrative, but few felt that any viable solutions had been tried, or even found, to the 
problems of infrastructure maintenance, credit availability, excessive taxation, or 
providing farmers with inputs. 
The Outlook for Liberalization 
Liberalization policies in themselves cannot remove the "constraints" outlined above, 
because these constraints reflect fundamental contradictions in the Zairian economy, 
especially with respect to food supply. Founded on the principles of compulsion and 
restricted trade, models of agricultural production and marketing were reproduced from 
the colonial model but without the investments made in that time. 
Today liberalization of the rice trade is severely restricted in areas where no 
investment is made in infrastructure or where concessions and plantations dominate, as is 
the case on the left bank of the Zaire River in the zones of Isangi and Yahuma. In 
Banalia Zone, to the north, there is a great deal more "free trade" but this is due to gold 
prospecting and smuggling activities, not to liberalization policies. Liberalization there 
has not Jed to noticeable investment in the area in terms of infrastructure, research, tools, 
seed distribution, or in noticeable improvements in farmers' living conditions. Further 
research is planned, however, to track developments in farming areas more systematically. 
The Jack of development in Banalia can be attributed to the fact that local 
officials capture much of the farmgate price increases, and that the mass of small traders 
with little or no capital have no way to attract credit or investment to the zone. In 
Banalia larger traders sought to contain the drainage of paddy by Lolema. They were not 
very successful, as witnessed by articles in the local paper decrying the anarchy in the 
rice trade (Elanga 1986) and by the steady rise in farmgate prices in the zone. Yet as 
traders' margins got smaller, the larger traders refused to buy in the area. When they do 
not buy, the smaller traders have few opportunities for transporting their paddy except 
bicycle and pirogue. 
11
rn terms of investment in production, the following can describe efforts being made: 
Seed distribution projects around Kisangani were very meager: Project Etime Banalia started in 1987; 2 ha for 
multiplication; INERA Turumbu, Isangi Zone affects a few surrounding villages, many too poor to hang on to seeds 
after harvest, according to the manager of Turumbu Cooperative; CODIS, a "Cooperative" in Isangi Zone (run by 
Kisangani-based elites), distributed seeds in five villages around Isangi town, in areas not suited to rice production; 
significant crop failures resulted. 
Roads: Sporadic maintenance of major roads. Nevertheless some remain almost impassible in rainy season (Isangi 
road, Opala road after 75 km). No repair of feeder roads. 
Tools and other inpu~ Manufactured tools are not available. Artisanally made tools are often very poorly made, 
break within a year, and are inappropriate for women. No fertilizers or pesticides are available for smallholders. 
Functioning rice mills left in interior: Banalia Zone 1, Isangi Zone 3, Opala Zone 2, Yahuma Zone 2 (?). 
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When farmgate prices approached Z1800 per sack in the 1987 campaign, many 
large traders interviewed refused to buy in Banalia. In 1988, a Banalia-based trader 
reported that no large trader bought that year and that Banalia was "totally infested with 
Lolema" (Yuma 1988). While this trend indicates the success of the small trader, it does not 
necessarily bring benefit to the farmer, for reasons discussed above, nor does it mean that 
individual petty traders benefit, in that their margins are cut with greater competition. 
With continued high unemployment and few other opportunities, petty trade remains the 
only activity open to many people. Traders also face competition from imported rice. At 
the end of July 1987, in the slack period for local rice, one rice merchant remarked that 
the price for rice in Kisangani declined drastically with an influx of imported rice (Z4100 
to Z2800). 
Ironically, Isangi town (the capital of the zone), which is largely under the control 
of one influential merchant, has benefitted from the installation of electricity, a water 
system, and even a small telephone linkage. Construction of a new hospital is underway. 
Yet it was reported that farmers there were blocked from selling their own rice in the 
market, and the powerful merchant's "cooperative" wants to return to the system of 
exchanging goods or credit in the company store for rice. 
In response to previous research on the rice trade, an FAO study recommended a 
return to the old monopoly system for rice (Mueller 1987), while others want to widen 
liberalization further through stricter enforcement, or wait for liberalization to work. 
Meanwhile, the Kinshasa daily, Elima, reported in March 1989 that tons of "green gold," as 
coffee is called in Haut Zaire, remains uncollected in the 1989 season due to neglected 
roads and lack of credit for traders. 
Fundamental economic change requires structural investment such as roads and 
agricultural extension, which are now primarily the province of private voluntary 
organizations and donors. At both the national and local level, these organizations often 
find themselves working at cross-purposes to the state. Thus any kind of meaningful 
change, which would involve putting money into the hands of those involved in primary 
production and transformation, stimulating conditions under which these individuals 
could operate without constant harassment, or raising urban consumers' purchasing power 
so that higher farmgate prices could be tolerated, is unlikely. 
Conclusions 
Hitherto, the debate about liberalization has been centered around its efficacy in 
increasing production and the possible negative effects of structural adjustment, such as 
higher consumer prices and wage freezes. This paper argues that one must look first at 
the structure of trade and production and concomitant social relations within both the 
political economy and the domestic economy. It is contended that policies will be shaped 
to fit those existing structures unless fundamental transformations take place in the 
allocation of resources, means of coercion or access to power. 
The paper has attempted to reveal the links between the structure of the Zairian 
political economy and individuals' strategies in participating in the rice trade. Studying 
the rice trade illustrates the struggles facing individuals, families, and businesses in and 
around Kisangani. Many of the structures and conflicts described here have been 
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observed and reported on in other areas of Zaire. 12 Zaire is a vast country, however, and 
micro-economies spring up quickly around areas of intense exploitation and on the 
borders (Newbury 1986). This activity does not, however, fundamentally alter the 
overarching structure of Zaire's dependent political economy, which is characterized, 
above all, by the fact that its rulers do not need to look after the welfare of the ordinary 
citizen in order to survive. 
Those who wish to change the rules are ultimately forced to play by the rules or 
get out. Such was the case of the most successful rice trader in Kisangani discussed above. 
This man was willing to invest in bridge and road repair and also paid cash immediately 
for paddy in an area formerly under the domination of large concerns such as PLZ and 
Busira-Lomami. On his last rice buying trip to Isangi Zone, he heard reports about 
elephant poachers who had killed a merchant and wounded the zone commissioner. He 
understood quickly that he was being "discouraged" to buy in the zone, and he 
immediately sold his truck. At the last report, he is still in Nigeria. 
12
Similar conflicts and structures pertaining to market structures and class divisions in rural areas can be found in 
Roberts (1987), Lemarchand (1979), Newbury (1987), and were observed in my own trips, during 1988, to Shaba, 
Bandundu, and Bas Zaire. 
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